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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a situation in which Betty Buyer purchases a computer printer
from Suzie Seller. The first time Betty attempts to print something, the
printer bursts into flames. By selling Betty a defective printer, Suzie has
breached the warranty of redhibition, which warrants that the thing sold is
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free from hidden defects.1 And yet, as a result of this redhibitory defect,
Suzie also may have breached the warranty of fitness for ordinary use, an
entirely separate warranty that guarantees the thing sold is reasonably fit
for its ordinary use.2 The court that addresses Betty’s claim must
characterize it as either a claim for breach of the warranty of redhibition
or a claim for breach of the warranty of fitness.3 The classification of
Betty’s claim bears capital importance because the rules governing the two
warranties differ substantially in terms of remedies and time constraints
on the buyer’s action.4 For instance, if the warranty of fitness governs
Betty’s claim, she will be subjected to a ten-year prescriptive period5 and
entitled to contractual damages, assuming Suzie had no knowledge of the
defect.6 Alternatively, if redhibition governs Betty’s claim, it will be
subjected to a shorter redhibitory prescriptive period of either one or four
years,7 and her remedy will be limited to rescission of the sale.8
Although it would seem that two distinct warranties governed by
wholly different rules would apply to separate and non-overlapping
circumstances, recent judicial pronouncements show that courts have

Copyright 2018, by SARA DANIEL.
1. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520 (2018) (providing the warranty against
redhibitory defects). Here, the printer suffers from a redhibitory defect that causes
it to catch on fire.
2. See id. art. 2524 (providing the warranty of fitness). The ordinary use of
a printer is to print. Thus, if the printer catches on fire while printing, it is not fit
for its ordinary use.
3. See generally id. arts. 2520, 2524.
4. See, e.g., id. arts. 2520–22, 2524, 2530–32, 2534, 2537–38, 2540–41,
2545, 2548.
5. See id. arts. 2524, 3499 (providing that a personal action is subject to a
liberative prescription of ten years unless otherwise provided by legislation).
6. See id. art. 2524 (providing that the general rules of conventional
obligations govern a buyer’s rights against a seller for breach of warranty of
fitness); see also id. art. 1994 (providing that an obligor is liable for damages
caused by his failure to perform a conventional obligation, which may consist of
nonperformance, defective performance, or delayed performance).
7. See id. art. 2534 (providing that the action for redhibition against a good
faith seller prescribes in four years from the date of delivery or one year from the
day the defect was discovered, whichever occurs first, and that the action for
redhibition against a bad faith seller prescribes one year from the day the defect
was discovered).
8. See id. art. 2520 (providing that a buyer has the right to rescission of a
sale or to a reduction in the price depending on the nature and extent of the defect).
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struggled to determine where one warranty ends and the other begins.9
According to one court that found the warranties of fitness and redhibition
to be mutually exclusive, “[The warranty of fitness] applies to a situation
in which the cause of action is based, not on the defective nature of the
thing at issue, but on its fitness for ordinary use . . . .”10 Another court,
however, held exactly the opposite: “[W]e find no reason to deem the two
articles exclusive.”11 Indeed, these attempts at distinction—or lack
thereof—are contradictory and fail to elucidate the circumstances under
which each warranty applies.12 The courts’ confusion is understandable,
however, because the legislative distinction between the two warranties is
largely artificial, and any separation is unnecessarily trivial.13
The differences in remedies, prescriptive periods, and overall legal
frameworks of the two warranties14 may also suggest a legislative
determination that, as a matter of policy, the breach of the warranty of
fitness is more egregious than the breach of the warranty of redhibition.
Further, because the legislature recently added the warranty of fitness,15 it
seems that perhaps this addition was the result of the legislature’s
deliberate recognition of the law’s previous failure to adequately address
fitness issues under the legal framework for redhibition. Surprisingly,
neither of these logical inferences is correct.16 Indeed, the warranty of

9. See, e.g., Mouton v. Generac Power Sys., Inc., 152 So. 3d 985 (La. Ct.
App. 2014); Sw. La. Hosp. Ass’n v. BASF Const. Chems., LLC, 947 F. Supp. 2d
661 (W.D. La. 2013); Hollybrook Cottonseed Processing, LLC v. Carver, Inc.,
No. 09-0750, 2010 WL 892869 (W.D. La. Mar. 11, 2010); Cunard Line Co. v.
Datrex, Inc., 926 So. 2d 109 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
10. Cunard Line Co., 926 So. 2d at 114. See also Stroderd v. Yamaha Motor
Corp., U.S.A., No. 04-3040, 2005 WL 2037419, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 2005)
(“[A] breach of contract of fitness for ordinary use claim is only an independent
cause of action when an item is free from redhibitory defects.”).
11. Justiss Oil Co., Inc. v. T3 Energy Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-01745, 2011
WL 539135, at *6 (W.D. La. Feb. 7, 2011). The court expressly invited the
Louisiana Supreme Court to provide clarification on the issue: “Without
Louisiana Supreme Court clarification on this issue, we are not reluctant to side
with the overwhelming majority of Louisiana appellate courts.” Id. at *5. See also
Sw. La. Hosp. Ass’n, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 690.
12. See, e.g., Sw. La. Hosp. Ass’n, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 690; Cunard Line Co.,
926 So. 2d at 114.
13. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
14. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1994, 2520, 2524, 2534, 3499 (2018);
see also discussion infra Part II.A.2.
15. See generally id. art. 2524 (eff. Jan. 1, 1995).
16. See discussion infra Part I.D.
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fitness—a common law creation—was never recognized as a stand-alone
warranty in Louisiana prior to 1995.17
By adopting the warranty of fitness as a stand-alone sales warranty,
the legislature created an artificial distinction between the warranties of
fitness and redhibition that Louisiana courts have been unable to
rationalize.18 If defects are redhibitory,19 the goods will be unfit for
ordinary use by default.20 Accordingly, the warranty of fitness for ordinary
use has no independent meaning in Louisiana law of sales.21 Courts have
reached different conclusions as to whether a buyer who alleges that a
product has a redhibitory defect can also argue that the defect renders the
product unfit for its ordinary use.22 Because courts differ on this point,
similarly situated parties throughout the state remain subject to different
rights and obligations.23
The time has come for Louisiana to rectify its mistakes of the past and
undo what never should have been done. This Comment revisits a problem
that was identified over a quarter-century ago24 and calls for the repeal of
the warranty of fitness for ordinary use as a separate warranty in
Louisiana.25 Part I provides an overview and brief history of the warranty
of fitness. It surveys the legislative and jurisprudential history of the
warranties of fitness and redhibition prior to 1995, analyzing Louisiana
jurisprudence and introducing the correlation between the warranties. Part
17. See discussion infra Part I.D.
18. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
19. A redhibitory defect is one that “renders the thing useless, or its use so
inconvenient that it must be presumed that a buyer would not have bought the
thing had he known of the defect” or else “without rendering the thing totally
useless, it diminishes its usefulness or its value so that it must be presumed that a
buyer would still have bought it but for a lesser price.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520.
The warranty of redhibition only covers defects that exist at the time of delivery.
See id. art. 2530. If a defect is apparent, it is not a redhibitory defect. Id. art. 2521.
20. See generally George L. Bilbe, Redhibition and Implied Warranties Under
the 1993 Revision of the Louisiana Law of Sales, 54 LA. L. REV. 125 (1993).
21. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
22. See, e.g., Cassidy v. Ford Motor Co., No. 15-2483, 2016 WL 687621, at
*4 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2016); 425 Notre Dame, LLC v. Kolbe & Kolbe Mill Work
Co., No. 15-454, 2016 WL 1110232, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 22, 2016); Sw. La.
Hosp. Ass’n v. BASC Constr. Chems., LLC, 947 F. Supp. 2d 661 (W.D. La.
2013); Justiss Oil Co. v. T3 Energy Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-01745, 2011 WL
539135, at *5 (W.D. La. Feb. 7, 2011); Cunard Line Co. v. Datrex, Inc., 926 So.
2d 109 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
23. See supra note 22.
24. See discussion infra Part I.E.
25. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2018).

2018]

COMMENT

285

I also assesses the impetus for codifying the warranty of fitness in
Louisiana. Part II of this Comment delineates the confusion the 1995
codification of the warranty of fitness created, including the warranty’s
lack of independent meaning and the uncertain scope of its application.
Part III proposes the repeal of the impractical and confusing warranty of
fitness for ordinary use and demonstrates that any purpose the article
sought to serve is better addressed through the warranties of redhibition
and fitness for particular use. This Comment concludes by demonstrating
that the repeal of the warranty of fitness for ordinary use is vital for the
preservation of redhibition, as well as for the development of the warranty
of fitness for particular use.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LOUISIANA SALES WARRANTIES: FROM ROMAN
LAW TO THE CURRENT CONFUSION
Louisiana law imposes various warranty26 obligations on sellers that
are implied by the operation of law regardless of whether they are
expressed in a sales agreement.27 In Louisiana, all sales, whether of
movable or immovable property, are made with two implied warranties
relating to quality.28 First, the seller warrants that the thing sold is free
from redhibitory vices or defects that would render it useless or would
significantly diminish its value.29 Second, the seller warrants that the thing
sold is reasonably fit for both its ordinary use and, under certain
circumstances, the particular use contemplated by the buyer.30 Although
current law articulates the seller’s obligations in fitness and redhibition as
distinct warranties subject to separate legal frameworks, this distinction
26. A “warranty” is an assurance that a seller makes regarding the goods or
services being sold. Robert P. Thibeaux et al., Implied Warranties and Waivers
(LA), PRAC. L. COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS (Aug. 2, 2017), https://us.practical
law.thomsonreuters.com/w-002-2088.
27. Id. The statutory warranties are suppletive, so parties are generally free to
limit or exclude one or more warranties within the limitations public policy dictates.
DIAN TOOLEY-KOBLETT & DAVID GRUNING, SALES § 10:14, in 24 LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE (Aug. 2017 update) (“Admittedly, the warranties appear to overlap,
and in practice it is sometimes difficult to determine which warranty is applicable
to a particular case. Understandably, courts have sometimes had difficulty
identifying the relevant warranty.”).
28. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2524. The seller also warrants the buyer against
eviction, which protects the buyer from “loss of, or danger of losing, the whole or part
of the thing sold because of a third person’s right that existed at the time of the sale.”
Id. art. 2500. But such warranty is outside the scope of this Comment.
29. Id. art. 2520.
30. Id. art. 2524.
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has not always existed.31 Whereas Louisiana has recognized the warranty
of redhibition since the promulgation of its first Civil Code in 1808,32 the
warranty of fitness is a new creation, codified as recently as 1995.33 A
complete understanding of the relationship between these warranties
therefore requires an exploration of their historical and jurisprudential
roots.
A. Louisiana Sales Warranties: In General
The warranty of redhibition protects a buyer against hidden defects in
the thing sold that diminish its value or usefulness.34 The Louisiana Civil
Code recognizes two types of redhibitory defects: one that renders the
thing useless or its use so inconvenient that it must be presumed that a
buyer would not have bought the thing had he known of the defect; and
one that, without rendering the thing totally useless, diminishes its
usefulness or value so that it must be presumed that a buyer would have
bought the thing at a lesser price.35 The former category of redhibitory
defect entitles the buyer to a rescission of the sale,36 whereas the latter
limits the buyer’s recovery to a reduction of the price.37 In the hypothetical
described in the Introduction, the printer suffered from a redhibitory
defect—namely, combustibility—that rendered its use so inconvenient
that Betty presumably would not have bought the printer had she known
of the defect.38 Accordingly, Betty would be entitled to rescission of the
sale.39 Assume, however, that the printer does not catch on fire but instead
prints gray lines across the page. This problem still constitutes a
redhibitory defect but one that, instead of rendering the printer completely
useless, diminishes its value such that a court would presume that Betty
would have paid a lesser price.40 Assuming the gray-line problem could be

31.
32.
33.
34.

H.B. 106, 1993 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 841 (1993).
See discussion infra Parts I.B.1–2.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (1995). See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520 (2018). See generally TOOLEY-KNOBLETT &
GRUNING, supra note 27.
35. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520.
36. Id. art. 2497 (providing that when the buyer has the right to recede from
the contract, the seller must return the price and reimburse the buyer for expenses
of the sale).
37. Id. art. 2524. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 27, § 11:2.
38. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520.
39. Id.
40. See id.
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fixed, Betty would be entitled to a reduction of the sales price in the
amount required to remedy the defect.41
If Betty’s claim is in redhibition, she must prove that the defect existed
at the time of delivery, that it was not apparent, and that it should not have
been discovered by a reasonably prudent buyer.42 Assuming Suzie did not
know of the defect at the time of the sale, Betty must give Suzie notice and
an opportunity to repair the defect.43 If Suzie cannot or will not correct it,
Betty is entitled to the return of the purchase price and reimbursement of
incidental expenses.44 Betty’s claim in redhibition prescribes either four
years from the delivery of the printer or one year from the date she
discovered the defect, whichever occurs first.45
In addition to redhibition, Betty has a second avenue for recovery—
breach of the warranty of fitness.46 The Louisiana Civil Code provides for
two types of warranties of fitness: fitness for ordinary use and fitness for
particular use.47 Fitness for ordinary use warrants that the thing sold is

41. Id.
42. Id. arts. 2521, 2530; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2521 cmt. c (2018) (“Under
this Article the standard of diligence that must be exercised by the buyer in
determining whether the thing purchased is defective is that of a prudent
administrator.”); id. art. 2521 cmt. d (“Under this Article the buyer must make
more than a casual observation of the object; he must examine the thing to
ascertain its soundness.”). See also discussion infra Part II.A.2.
43. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2522.
44. Id. art. 2531. Incidental expenses include “reasonable expenses occasioned
by the sale, as well as those incurred for the preservation of the thing, less the credit
to which the seller is entitled if the use made of the thing, or the fruits it has yielded,
were of some value to the buyer.” Id. Alternatively, a bad faith seller—one who
knows that the thing sold has a defect but fails to declare it or makes a false
declaration regarding the quality of the thing—is liable to the buyer for the return
of the purchase price with interest from the time it was paid, reimbursement of
reasonable expenses occasioned by the sale and incurred for the preservation of the
thing, and for damages and reasonable attorney fees. Id. art. 2545.
45. Id. art. 2534. The action for redhibition against a seller who knew, or is
presumed to have known, of the existence of a defect in the thing sold prescribes
one year from the day the buyer discovered the defect. Id.; see LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2534 cmt. b (“[A]n action in redhibition prescribes ten years from the
time of perfection of the contract regardless of whether the seller was in good or
bad faith.”); id. cmt. c (“The purpose of a longer prescriptive period is to
discourage precipitate action by disappointed buyers, to facilitate the settlement
of disputes between buyers and sellers, and to make the prescriptive period
consistent with the one prevailing in other jurisdictions.”).
46. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524.
47. Id.
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reasonably fit for its ordinary use.48 Fitness for particular use warrants that
the thing is fit for the buyer’s particular use if and only if the seller has
reason to know the buyer’s particular or intended use and that the buyer is
relying on the seller’s skill or judgment in selecting the thing.49 Plainly, a
printer that catches fire is unfit for its ordinary use of printing.50 Suppose,
however, that the printer only caught fire when performing large-scale print
jobs and that Betty told Suzie she wanted a printer that could print large
documents. Under these circumstances, the printer would likely remain fit
for ordinary use because it still prints documents, but nonetheless would be
unfit for Betty’s particular purpose.51 In either case, the general rules of
conventional obligations would govern Betty’s claim for breach of the
warranty of fitness.52
If Betty succeeded in her claim for breach of the warranty of fitness,
she could obtain dissolution of the sale as well as contractual damages for
Suzie’s noncompliance with the warranty.53 Betty need not give Suzie the
opportunity to repair the defect regardless of whether she had knowledge
of the defect.54 Significantly, a claim for breach of the warranty of fitness
is subject to the ten-year prescriptive period applicable to conventional
obligations.55

48. Id.
49. Id. (“When the seller has reason to know the particular use the buyer
intends for the thing, or the buyer’s particular purpose for buying the thing, and
that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment in selecting it, the thing
sold must be fit for the buyer’s intended use or for his particular purpose.”).
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. Id. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
53. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (providing that the buyer’s rights for a seller’s
breach of the warranty of fitness are governed by the rules of conventional
obligations); see generally id. arts. 1994, 1995, 2013. Contractual damages are
comprised of losses sustained and profits deprived. Id. art. 1995.
54. Id. art. 2524. A good faith obligor is only liable for the damages that were
foreseeable at the time the contract was made. Id. art. 1996. A bad faith obligor is
liable for all damages, foreseeable or not, that are a direct consequence of his
failure to perform. Id. art. 1997. See also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1997 cmt. b
(2018) (“An obligor is in bad faith if he intentionally and maliciously fails to
perform his obligation.”); id. cmt. c (“A truly fraudulent failure to perform of
course, would constitute bad faith under this Article.”).
55. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3499. The prescriptive period begins to run the
moment the cause of action arises—namely, the date of the obligor’s failure to
perform. Hawthorne Land Co. v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 431 F.3d 221, 228 (5th
Cir. 2005).
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B. Legislative and Jurisprudential History: Before the Codified
Confusion
Although Louisiana currently recognizes two warranties of quality,
this was not always the case.56 The Louisiana Civil Code has long
encompassed the civilian institution of redhibition.57 The common law
warranty of fitness, however, emerged in Louisiana and grew through the
case law, codified only in 1995.58 Understanding the complicated
relationship between the two warranties,59 therefore, requires a thorough
examination of Louisiana’s espousal of each.
1. Redhibition: A Civilian Institution
The civil law historically has acknowledged and sought to remedy the
problem of latent defects in goods by restoring parties to the positions they
would have occupied had the defect not caused the failed performance.60
The action of redhibition originated in Rome as a system of implied
warranty against latent defects and remained largely intact as it permeated
Louisiana law by way of France.61 Over time, Louisiana has added its own
nuances to redhibition, but much of the Roman law endures.62
Beginning in Rome around the 1st century B.C., the curule aediles63
forced individuals who sold slaves to stipulate expressly that the slaves

56. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (eff. Jan. 1, 1995).
57. See discussion infra Part I.B.1.
58. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
59. See discussion infra Part II.A.
60. Young v. Ford Motor Co., 595 So. 2d 1123, 1128 (La. 1992). See, e.g.,
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520 (1870); id. art. 2496 (1825); id. art. 66 (1808); CODE
NAPOLEON art. 1641 (1804); JUSTINIAN’S DIGEST 21.1.1, § 6.
61. Leonard Oppenheim, The Law of Slaves—A Comparative Study of the
Roman and Louisiana Systems, 14 TUL. L. REV. 384, 399 (1940). See generally
Shael Herman, The Contribution of Roman Law to the Jurisprudence of
Antebellum Louisiana, 56 LA. L. REV. 257, 264–65 (1995).
62. Christopher K. Odinet, Commerce, Commonality, and Contract Law:
Legal Reform in a Mixed Jurisdiction, 75 LA. L. REV. 741, 760 (2015). These
minor updates were necessary to modernize and provide more even-handedness
and predictability in the law. Id.
63. The curule aediles was the officer in charge of regulating markets and
solving conflicts between buyers and sellers. Elizabeth A. Spurgeon, All For One
or Every Man for Himself? What is Left of Solidarity in Redhibition, 70 LA. L.
REV. 1227, 1230 (2010).
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were free from defects.64 If the seller’s statements were untrue, the buyer
could bring an action in redhibition within six months to rescind the sale
and receive a return of the purchase price.65 Thus, Roman law remedied
complaints of latent defects by returning the parties to their positions
before the sale—a restoration of the status quo.66 These rules were later
incorporated into Justinian’s Digest67 and broadened to cover all
movables.68 When the defect was apparent, the rules of redhibition did not
apply.69 The seriousness of the defect dictated whether the buyer was
entitled to rescission of the sale—actio redhibitoria—or monetary
compensation for the difference between the sale price and the value of
the defective item—quanti minoris.70
As the Roman law of obligations infiltrated France, redhibition
developed and obtained a significant presence in French law.71 The Code
Napoléon provided:
The seller is bound to warranty in respect of secret defects in the
thing sold which render it improper for the use to which it was
destined, or which so far diminish such use, that the buyer would
not have purchased it, or would not have given so large a price, if
he had known them.72

64. Daniel E. Murray, Implied Warranty Against Latent Defects: A Historical
Comparative Law Study, 21 LA. L. REV. 586, 595 (1960). During this period, the
rules for slaves were extended to animals, but it is unclear whether they were
extended to movables. Id. Subsequently, express warranties were no longer
mandated, but the curule aediles required the seller to announce that the slave did
not have certain defects. Id.
65. Spurgeon, supra note 63, at 1231. A seller’s ignorance of the defect was
not a valid defense. Murray, supra note 64.
66. Bruce V. Schewe & Debra J. Hale, Review of Recent Developments:
1991–1992, 53 LA. L. REV. 917, 919 (1993).
67. On Emperor Justinian’s order, Justinian’s Digest was compiled from 530
to 533 A.D. as part of the Corpus Juris Civilis, a compilation of the writings of the
classical jurists. See generally Stephen Utz, Book Review, 11 CONN. J. INT’L L. 395
(1996) (reviewing DAVID PUGSLEY, JUSTINIAN’S DIGEST AND THE COMPILERS
(1995)). Specifically, the Digest was a compilation of dozens of classical jurists’
writings and was designed to be a comprehensive text of Roman law. Id.
68. Murray, supra note 64.
69. JUSTINIAN’S DIGEST 21.1.1, § 6.
70. Spurgeon, supra note 63, at 1231.
71. Id.
72. CODE NAPOLÉON art. 1641 (1804).
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As was the case under Roman law, the seller was not accountable for
apparent defects.73 The buyer could return the thing and obtain restitution
of the price or, alternatively, keep the thing and receive “such a portion of
the price . . . as shall be settled by competent persons.”74 If the seller knew
of the defect, he was bound to pay damages and return the purchase price
along with any expenses occasioned by the sale, but if he did not have
knowledge, he was bound only to pay restitution of the purchase price and
reimburse expenses occasioned by the sale.75
Influenced by its Roman and French predecessors, redhibition in early
Louisiana law protected slave and animal buyers, among others, against
latent defects that were non-apparent76 and unknown to the buyer at the
time of the sale.77 Like its antecedents, the Code of 1808 distinguished
between the seller’s liability for defects that were known and unknown to
him.78 It required the defect to have existed at the time of the sale, although

73. Id. art. 1642.
74. Id. art. 1644.
75. Id. art. 1646. Under early French law, there was no bright-line
prescriptive period attached to a redhibition claim; rather, the action had to be
brought “within a short interval, according to the nature of such faults, and the
usage of the place where the sale was made.” Id. art. 1648.
76. The seller was not accountable for the apparent defects or vices that the
buyer could have seen himself, “as, for instance, if a horse has his eyes put out.” Id.
art. 69. “The buyer cannot complain of a defect of which he is ignorant only through
his own fault, any more than of those that the seller may have declared to him.” Id.
77. The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 provided: “The seller is bound to
declare to the buyer the defects of the thing sold, as far as they are known to him,
and if he does not do it, the sale shall be cancelled or the price shall be diminished
according to the kind of defects.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 66 (1808). The Code defined
redhibition as “the cancelling of the sale on account of some defect in the thing
sold, such as may be sufficient to oblige the seller to take it back again and have
the sale annulled.” Id. art. 65. It defined redhibitory defects and those that render
the thing absolutely unfit for the purpose for which it was intended in commerce,
diminishing its utility or rendering it so inconvenient that it is presumable that if
these defects had been known to the buyer, he would not have bought at all or
would have bought at a reduced price. Id. art. 67.
78. “Although the defects of the thing sold were unknown to the seller, he
will nevertheless be responsible, if these defects are of a hidden nature, and the
seller may, in this case, have the sale cancelled or have the price lessened . . . .”
Id. art. 68. “If the seller was acquainted with the defects of the thing, he is liable
to all damages toward the buyer, besides the restitution of the price he may have
received.” Id. art. 71. “If the seller was ignorant of the defects of the thing, he
shall only be obliged to the restitution of the price and to make reimbursement to
the buyer of the costs occasioned by the sale.” Id. art. 72.

292

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

a defect that appeared immediately after or within three days following the
sale was presumed to have existed at the time of the sale.79
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 amended the definition of redhibition
to encompass “the avoidance of a sale on account of some vice or defect in
the thing sold, which renders it either absolutely useless, or its use so
inconvenient and imperfect, that it must be supposed that the buyer would
not have purchased it, had he known of the vice.”80 Apart from minor
changes in semantics and a lengthening of the prescriptive period,81 the
Code of 1825 preserved the law of redhibition as it previously existed.82
Likewise, the Code of 1870 retained the characteristics of the Code of
1825.83 The traditional law of redhibition thus remains largely intact today,
enduring as a civilian institution embedded deeply in Louisiana law.84
2. The Warranty of Fitness: A Jurisprudential Embracement
In contrast to the state’s long history with the warranty of redhibition,
Louisiana’s relationship with the warranty of fitness is limited.85 The
legislature did not adopt the warranty until 1995, but the notion of “fitness”
was not foreign to Louisiana law prior to that time.86 Indeed, Louisiana
courts formerly recognized “fitness” as a component of redhibition,87
79. Id. art. 76. The buyer could initiate the action within six months from the
date of the sale or from the time the defect was discovered, provided that more
than one year had not elapsed since the sale. Id. art. 75.
80. Id. art. 2496 (1825).
81. When the seller did not know of the vice, the redhibitory action had to be
commenced within a year of the date of the sale. Id. art. 2512. When the seller knew
of the vice and failed to declare it, the action could be commenced at any time,
provided that a year had not elapsed since the discovery of the vice. Id. art. 2524.
82. As in the Code of 1808, neither apparent defects nor defects that the seller
declared to the buyer prior to the sale constituted redhibitory defects. Id. arts.
2497–98. Likewise, the defect must have existed before the sale. Id. art. 2508. A
good faith seller was bound to restore the price and to reimburse the expenses
occasioned by the sale and incurred for the preservation of the thing, but a bad
faith seller was answerable in damages. Id. arts. 2509, 2523.
83. See generally id. arts. 2520–47 (1870).
84. See generally supra note 4.
85. Id. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (eff. Jan 1, 1995).
86. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 cmt. a (2018) (noting that, although the
article is new, it does not change the law because the Louisiana jurisprudence has
recognized the existence of the obligation).
87. See, e.g., Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am.,
Inc., 262 So. 2d 377 (La. 1972); Falk v. Luke Motor Co., 112 So. 2d 683 (La.
1959); Radalec Inc. v. Automatic Firing Corp., 81 So. 2d 830 (La. 1955); Jackson
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suggesting an inherent endorsement of fitness long before its eventual
enactment.
The warranty of fitness first appeared in Louisiana jurisprudence in
the 1900 case of Fee v. Sentell, in which the Louisiana Supreme Court
stated, “We are only announcing a principle which no one denies when we
state that the vendor, unless warranty is waived, warrants the thing sold as
fit for the particular purpose for which it was bought.”88 Fee involved the
sale of sugarhouse machinery, which the buyer alleged was not what the
vendor guaranteed because it was in imperfect condition, broken, and unfit
for use.89 Recognizing that secondhand machines cannot do the work of
new ones, the court stated that a secondhand machine must nonetheless be
“fit to do the work the contract intended.”90 In so stating, the court did not
attempt to distinguish fitness from redhibition91 but, rather, appeared to
utilize different terminology to refer to the same concept.92
Louisiana courts subsequently alluded to the existence of a warranty
of fitness without distinguishing it from the warranty of redhibition.93 For
example, in Falk v. Luke Motor Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that an automobile that will not run, or that runs intermittently and requires
the frequent attention of a mechanic, is “manifestly not fit or acceptable
for the purposes intended” and granted relief under the law of
redhibition.94
Courts also continually referred to products as “unfit” for use because
of latent defects, effectively analyzing fitness as a component of

v. Breard Motor Co., 120 So. 478 (La. 1929); Crawford v. Abbott Auto. Co., 101
So. 871, 872 (La. 1924).
88. Fee v. Sentell, 28 So. 279, 282 (La. 1900).
89. Id. at 280.
90. Id. at 282.
91. Id. at 279 (noting that a vendee is not entitled to an action quantum
minoris for defects discoverable on mere inspection).
92. Id. at 282–83 (“The buyer, in our judgment, is without the right to a
diminution of the price for any defect discoverable upon simple inspection.”)
(emphasis added).
93. LA. STATE L. INST., REVISION OF THE LAW OF SALES: WARRANTY OF
FITNESS, No. 8-1-89, at 3 (Nov. 17–18, 1989) (prepared for Meeting of the
Council by Saul Litvinoff, Reporter). See also supra note 87.
94. Falk v. Luke Motor Co., 112 So. 2d 683, 686 (“[H]aving purchased this
car to meet specific needs and a desirable increase in the volume of his business,
its defects, imperfections, and successive mechanical failures requiring almost
constant replacements, changes and repairs became a malignant and oppressive
burden, the relief from which is to be found in the redhibitory action.”).
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redhibition.95 In Media Production Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of
North America, Inc., for example, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed
an appellate court’s ruling that denied warranty rights to the purchaser of
an imported Mercedes-Benz against the American distributor of
Mercedes-Benz that supplied the automobile to the dealer.96 Immediately
after the purchase, the buyer found the automobile “unsuitable for use,”
alleging a number of defects.97 In holding that the buyer could recover
from the defendant, the Court stated, “We see no reason why the
[consumer-protection] rule should not apply to the pecuniary loss resulting
from the purchase of a new automobile that proves unfit for use because
of latent defects.”98 The Court evidently viewed fitness as a component of,
or a way of establishing, redhibition rather than as a stand-alone
warranty.99 Likewise, in Young v. Ford Motor Co., the Louisiana Supreme
Court referred again to fitness as a way of establishing the existence of a
defect, stating, “A buyer of an automobile who asserts a redhibition claim
need not show the particular cause of the defects making the vehicle unfit
for the intended purposes, but rather must simply prove the actual
existence of such defects.”100 By acknowledging that the combination of
vices rendering the car unfit for use resulted in a claim of redhibition, the
Court treated the warranty of fitness as indistinguishable from the
warranty against redhibitory defects.101
Before the codification of the warranty of fitness, even when courts
seemingly identified it as independent and distinct from the warranty
against redhibitory defects,102 the distinction was inconsequential because
Louisiana courts recognized no remedies beyond those under
redhibition.103 Even if the court referred to the warranties of redhibition
and fitness independently, the same legal framework governed each.104
95. See, e.g., Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am.,
Inc., 262 So. 2d 377, 381 (La. 1972).
96. Id. at 377.
97. Id. at 380. The defects included: a peeling off of the interior trim; failure
of the interior lights to burn; transmission problems; stalling in traffic; a defective
air conditioner; excessive brake squeal; deterioration of rear window channels;
uncorrectable vibration; and paint deficiencies. Id.
98. Id. at 381.
99. Id.
100. Young v. Ford Motor Co., 595 So. 2d 1123, 1126 (La. 1992).
101. Id.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 226–30.
103. See, e.g., Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So. 2d 840 (La. 1974); Hob’s Refrigeration
& Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Poche, 304 So. 2d 326, 328 (La. 1974).
104. See, e.g., Young, 595 So. 2d at 1126; Rey, 298 So. 2d at 840; Hob’s
Refrigeration, 304 So. 2d at 328; Media Prod. Consultants, 262 So. 2d at 377.
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Until the revision of the law of sales in 1995, courts conceived fitness as
comprising part of the warranty against redhibition.105 The failure of a
thing to be fit for use constituted a breach of the warranty of redhibition;
proof that the thing was unfit for use was proof of a defect’s existence; and
breach of fitness resulted in the seller’s liability under redhibition.106
Although courts did not refer to the warranty of “particular use” by
name prior to the Sales Revision, a solution existed if a seller delivered a
thing that was not defective but otherwise did not meet a buyer’s
expectations: the law of conventional obligations.107 Some cases referred
to a warranty of fitness for “intended” use,108 but like ordinary fitness, the
courts considered it merely an element of redhibition.109 Although it may
seem unusual for courts to fashion new terminology—namely, fitness—
Indeed, in the 1961 decision of Crowley Grain Drier, Inc. v. Fontenot, a Louisiana
appellate court stated that “unlike damages for other contractual breaches,
damages caused by a breach of the warranty in a contract of sale are regarded as
founded upon redhibition and subject instead to the cited codal prescription . . .
applicable to redhibitory actions.” 132 So. 2d 573, 577 (La. Ct. App. 1961).
105. See cases cited supra note 104.
106. See cases cited supra note 104. Redhibitory remedies included either
reduction of the price or rescission and, in the case of the seller’s knowledge of
the offending defect, damages and attorney fees. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2531,
2545 (2018).
107. See, e.g., Victory Oil, Co. v. Perret 183 So. 2d 360, 364 (La. Ct. App.
1966) (“The defendants . . . have injected the false issue of redhibition . . . in an
attempt to bring the action within a one year prescriptive period. We hold that the
real issue raised by the petition in reconvention is one of damages arising out of
an alleged breach of contract.”); see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2529 cmt. a
(2018) (providing that the article, although new, does not change the law); id. art.
2529 cmt. f (“When a product is contracted for and a product other than what was
agreed upon is supplied, such a situation gives rise to an action for breach of
contract . . . .”).
108. See, e.g., Media Prod. Consultants, 262 So. 2d at 380 (“Two warranty
obligations are inherent in every sale, the warranty of merchantable title and the
warranty of reasonable fitness for the product’s intended use.”) (emphasis added);
Falk v. Luke Motor Co., 112 So. 2d 683, 686 (La. 1959) (“[A] car which will not
run or which runs intermittently requiring the frequent attention of a mechanic to
keep it going is an abomination and is manifestly not fit or acceptable for the
purposes intended.”) (emphasis added); Jackson v. Breard Motor Co., 120 So. 478,
479 (La. 1929) (“It cannot be denied that an automobile which is not in running
condition is not fit for the purpose intended.”) (emphasis added); Crawford v.
Abbott Auto. Co., 101 So. 871, 872 (La. 1924) (“It is not incumbent upon the buyer
to seek out, allege, and prove the particular and underlying cause of the defects
which make the thing sold unfit for the purpose intended . . . .”) (emphasis added).
109. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
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for an already existing framework, the term had roots in the common law
with which the courts undoubtedly were familiar.110
C. Common Law Warranties of Fitness and Merchantability: A Possible
Explanation for Article 2524
Although the civil law historically sought to protect buyers from
defective goods through redhibition,111 the English doctrine of caveat
emptor112 long prevailed in the common law, affording limited protection
to buyers.113 Until the 19th century, English courts suggested that a seller
could not be held liable for selling an item of substandard quality unless
he had knowledge of such quality.114 It was not until the seminal decision
of Gardiner v. Gray that the implied warranty of merchantability115
appeared in the common law.116 In Gardiner, the buyer bought silk of
“waste” grade from Gray but received silk of an even lower grade.117 For
the first time, the court held that caveat emptor did not apply to a buyer
who did not have an opportunity to inspect the goods.118 The question for
110. See discussion infra Part I.C.
111. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
112. The doctrine of caveat emptor declares that a purchaser is expected to
make his own examination of products, and a vendor is generally not liable for
any harm resulting to him or others resulting from defects existing at the time of
the transfer. Coastline Terminals of Conn., Inc. v. USX Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d
203, 209 (D. Conn. 2001); see also State ex rel. Jones Store Co. v. Shain, 179
S.W.2d 19, 20 (Mo. 1944) (Under the rule of caveat emptor, “the buyer takes the
risk of quality and condition unless he protects himself by warranty, or there has
been a false representation made fraudulently by the vendor”).
113. Young v. Ford Motor Co., 595 So. 2d 1123, 1128 (La. 1992).
114. 18 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 52:67 (4th ed. 2017). See, e.g., Parkinson
v. Lee, 102 E.R. 389 (1802) (“[T]he law does not raise an implied warranty that the
commodity should be merchantable; though a fair merchantable price were given;
and therefore if there be a latent defect then existing in it, unknown to the seller, and
without fraud on his part, such seller is not answerable, though the goods turned out
to be unmerchantable.”) (internal parenthetical information omitted).
115. Although “merchantability” was not defined during the common-law era,
courts spoke of merchantable goods as being “of a quality such as is generally
sold in the market and suitable for the purpose for which they [were] intended,
although not of the best quality.” Wallace v. L.D. Clark & Son, 174 P. 557, 558
(Okla. 1918).
116. Don Brown, Sales—Breach of Implied Warranty, 23 TEX. L. REV. 200,
200 (1945). See Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 144, 171 (K.B. 1815).
117. Gardiner, 4 Camp. at 171.
118. Id. (“Without any particular warranty, this is an implied term in every
such contract . . . . He cannot without a warranty insist that it shall be of any
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the court became whether the item purchased was of such a quality “as can
be reasonably brought into the market to be sold as such waste silk . . . .”119
In holding for the buyer, the court concluded that the silk was unfit for the
purposes of waste silk and thus could not be sold for the requisite value.120
Courts thereafter began to recognize that at least if the goods were
purchased by description, a commercial seller of goods impliedly
warranted them to be of merchantable quality.121
The modern iteration of the English warranty of merchantability is
codified in the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”).122 Article 2 of the
U.C.C., which governs the sale of goods in every state but Louisiana,123
provides two different warranties of quality: the warranty of
merchantability, which encompasses fitness for ordinary use; and the
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose known to the seller.124 The
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness operate to protect buyers

particular quality or fitness, but the intention of both parties must be taken to be,
that it shall be saleable in the market under the denomination mentioned in the
contract between them.”).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Brown, supra note 116. See Gardiner, 4 Camp. 114. “[I]t was
acknowledged in numerous early cases that a manufacturer impliedly warrants its
goods to be merchantable, that is, that they are reasonably fit for the general
purpose for which they were manufactured.” WILLISTON, supra note 114.
122. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. COMM’N 2018). The
Uniform Sales Act followed the English Sale of Goods Act, which was intended
to codify the previously existed common law, on the subject of implied warranties
of quality. WILLISTON, supra note 114. The U.C.C. provisions on the implied
warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose have superseded
the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act. Id.
123. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 27, § 1:4.
124. See generally U.C.C. §§ 2-314 and 2-315. The applicability of one
warranty over another depends on whether the buyer’s purpose is “ordinary” or
“particular.” This is a significant distinction when goods are fit for ordinary
purposes, thus satisfying the warranty of merchantability, but are otherwise unfit
for the buyer’s particular purpose, thus breaching the warranty of fitness. Vincent
M. Gonzales, The Buyer’s Specifications Exception to the Implied Warranty of
Fitness for a Particular Purpose: Design or Performance?, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
237, 249 (1987). According to the legislative commentary, a particular purpose
differs from an ordinary purpose because a particular purpose envisions a buyer’s
specific use “which is peculiar to the nature of his business,” whereas an ordinary
purpose entails “uses which are customarily made of the goods in question.” See
U.C.C. § 2-315 cmt. 2.
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from loss resulting from the sale of goods below commercial standards or
unfit for the buyer’s particular purpose.125
The warranty of merchantability provides, in relevant part, that if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind, the goods must be
fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are normally used.126 A
breach of the warranty of merchantability “will be readily found . . . where
the goods are so obviously defective that they are not suitable for any of
their ordinary uses or at least for their principal use.”127 The absence of a
manifested defect precludes a cognizable claim for breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability.128 Thus, under the U.C.C., a product is fit for
ordinary use when it is free from defects that would inhibit its use.129 In
contrast, when an action is based on breach of warranty of fitness, the
product may be entirely free from defects yet unfit for the particular
purpose that the buyer intends.130 Thus, the common law’s warranty of
fitness for particular purpose exists, as under Louisiana law, irrespective
of the existence of a defect.131
Although courts originally conceived the warranty of merchantability
as one in tort,132 courts today generally recognize that breach of an implied
warranty can sound in either contract or tort, depending on the

125. WILLISTON, supra note 114.
126. U.C.C. § 2-314. See WILLISTON, supra note 114, § 52:77. “Ordinary
purposes” include those the manufacturer or seller intended and those that are
reasonably foreseeable. Id.
127. WILLISTON, supra note 114, § 52:77. Goods are not fit for their ordinary
purposes “when they break or need frequent or extensive repairs early on when
used in an ordinary manner; [or] when they are completely useless and therefore
unfit for any purpose.” 26 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS § 6 (2d ed. 2017).
128. In re Air Bag Products Liability Litigation, 7 F. Supp. 2d 792, 805 (E.D.
La. 1998). It is well established that “[p]urchasers of an allegedly defective
product have no legally recognizable claim where the alleged defect has not
manifested itself in the product they own.” Id. (quoting Hubbard v. General
Motors Corp, 1996 WL 274018, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1996)).
129. See, e.g., Rudolph v. Huckman, 267 A.2d 896 (Del. 1970) (holding that a
boat is not of merchantable quality when, because of numerous defects, it cannot
be used); see also Limestone Farms, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 29 P.3d 457, 461 (Kan.
2001) (“Implied warranties arise by operation of law . . . their purpose being to
protect a consumer from loss where merchandise fails to meet normal commercial
standards.”).
130. Barazzotto v. Intelligent Sys., Inc., 532 N.E.2d 148, 150 (Oh. Ct. App. 1987).
131. See generally U.C.C. § 2-315; see also discussion infra Part II.B.
132. H.B. 106, 1993 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 841.
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circumstances.133 In either event, the contractual warranty of
merchantability serves as a rough analogue to Louisiana’s warranty
against redhibitory defects in the context of sales of goods, providing the
buyer with a remedy if the goods sold to him do not conform to the
accepted standards of quality, just as the contractual warranty of fitness is
an analogue to Louisiana’s warranty of fitness for particular use.134
D. Impetus of Codification
In 1985, under the leadership of Professor Saul Litvinoff, the
Louisiana State Law Institute135 commenced a wholesale revision of the
law of sales with the goal of modernizing the law.136 Because Louisiana
had experienced vast societal changes since the enactment of the sales title,
the Law Institute deemed a wholesale revision of the law appropriate.137
National and international legislative innovations in the law of sales stood
in clear contrast to Louisiana’s outdated provisions.138 Article 2 of the
U.C.C. and the 1980 Convention on International Sales served as models
for the Law Institute, offering practical approaches to contemporary sales
problems.139 The revision embraced several Article 2 provisions, but the

133. See, e.g., JCW Elecs., Inc. v. Garza, 257 S.W.3d 701, 704 (Tex. 2008).
Courts identify the nature of the claim by examining the damages alleged—if the
damages alleged are purely economic, the claim is contractual; if the damages
alleged are for personal injury, the claim is tortious. Id. at 705.
134. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2524 (2018); U.C.C. §§ 2-314,
2-315.
135. The Louisiana State Law Institute is an official advisory law revision
commission, law reform agency, and legal research agency of the State of
Louisiana. LA. REV. STAT. § 24:201 (2018).
136. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 27, § 1:6. The Law
Institute initiated the sales revision as part of the ongoing revision of the Louisiana
Civil Code. Id. Professor Litvinoff drafted revision proposals for consideration,
which the Council of the Louisiana State Law Institute either accepted or rejected
after extensive discussion. Id.
137. J. Peter Kovata, The Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code Sales Title: In
Many Ways a Non-Event, 40 LOY. L. REV. 139 (1994); see also TOOLEYKNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 27, § 1:6.
138. H.B. 106, 1993 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 841.
139. Id. The Law Institute debated adopting Article 2 of the U.C.C. in globo,
but the Council ultimately decided that certain common law provisions were
inconsistent with fundamental principles of Louisiana law. Id.
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drafters professed to retain the basic civilian character of the Louisiana
law of sales,140 preserving redhibition as a Louisiana institution.141
Although the sales revision project commenced in 1985,142 the idea of
adopting a separate warranty of fitness was not introduced until 1989
when, in considering the definitional article for redhibition, a Law Institute
Council member moved to remove the idea of fitness from the law of
redhibition and to create a stand-alone warranty encompassing the
concept.143 Because of redhibition’s similarity to the warranty of
merchantability,144 this Council member presumably desired to
incorporate the warranty of fitness for particular use into Louisiana’s law,
although the minutes of the Council meeting indicate that the Council did
not discuss the distinction between merchantability and fitness.145
Thereafter, the Council requested that the project’s reporter, Professor
Litvinoff, consider the possibility of creating a separate warranty of fitness
distinct from the warranty of redhibition.146 Professor Litvinoff complied
with this request and assessed the need for such a warranty.147 Ultimately,
Professor Litvinoff recommended the Sales Committee avoid this
approach, finding the adoption of the warranty of fitness in Louisiana both
unnecessary and potentially problematic.148 In a memorandum to his
Committee, Professor Litvinoff recommended as follows:
It seems to the Reporter that adoption by the Council of the
warranty of fitness as a separate warranty in the Louisiana law of
sales would carry the danger of introducing ‘through the back
door’ the tort approach of the U.C.C. into the Louisiana law of
redhibition. This could wreak veritable havoc in the law, one of
140. Id.
141. Odinet, supra note 62, at 766. “Not eager to be completely submerged
under the common law waters, Louisiana chose to moor itself to the ancient civil
law institution of redhibition.” Id. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
142. LA. STATE L. INST., MEETING OF THE COUNCIL, Revision of the Law of
Sales: Redhibition, at 4 (May 19–20, 1989).
143. Id.
144. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
145. See generally supra note 142.
146. LA. STATE L. INST., REVISION OF THE LAW OF SALES: WARRANTY OF
FITNESS, No. 8-1-89, at 1 (Nov. 17–18, 1989) (prepared for Meeting of the
Council by Saul Litvinoff, Reporter).
147. Id.
148. Id. (“At the meeting of May, 1989 the Reporter was asked to give some
Summer thoughts to the possibility of incorporating into the articles on redhibition
a separate warranty of fitness of a thing for its intended use. The Reporter has
done so and reached the conclusion that no such warranty is needed.”).

2018]

COMMENT

301

the probable results of which would be the demise of the law of
redhibition. On the other hand, the Reporter sees no need for
introducing legislation on the warranty of fitness, since, in the
Reporter’s opinion, the proposed articles on redhibition strike a
fair balance between the interests of buyer and seller and are
suitable for solving most of the problems that arise in this area.149
By stating that the proposed redhibition articles would solve most
potential problems,150 Professor Litvinoff likely meant that Louisiana law
adequately remedied the sale of both defective and non-defective goods
without a separate warranty of fitness.151 He recognized that Louisiana
courts already acknowledged the role that fitness—in the sense of
merchantability—played in redhibition.152 Moreover, the revision effort
already addressed any concern about leaving a buyer unprotected when he
purchased a thing that, although not defective, did not conform to his
expectations.153 Thus, no gap in the law existed to justify the adoption of
the warranty of fitness as a stand-alone warranty; redhibition already
encompassed fitness for ordinary use, and the law could handle problems
of non-redhibitory, but otherwise non-conforming, goods as breach of
contract claims.154
Despite Professor Litvinoff’s view, he anticipated that other
committee members would feel differently.155 As such, he proposed two
variations of a warranty of fitness article, both sourced from the U.C.C.156
The first proposed article stated:
149. Id. at 6.
150. Id.
151. See infra text accompanying notes 152–54.
152. LA. STATE L. INST., supra note 146, at 6 (prepared for Meeting of the
Council by Saul Litvinoff, Reporter). See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
153. The Council adopted current article 2529, which provides for contractual
damages when a thing sold is free from redhibitory defects but otherwise not of
the kind or quality specified in the contract, prior to Professor Litvinoff’s
recommendation. LA. STATE L. INST., REVISION OF THE LAW OF SALES:
REDHIBITION, No. 7-17-89, at 1 (Nov. 17–18, 1989) (prepared for Meeting of the
Council by Saul Litvinoff, Reporter). See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2529 (2018) (“When
the thing the seller has delivered, though in itself free from redhibitory defects, is
not of the kind or quality specified in the contract or represented by the seller, the
rights of the buyer are governed by other rules of sale and conventional
obligations.”). Even without this article, however, the same result exists under
sales law and the law of conventional obligations.
154. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2529.
155. See LA. STATE L. INST., supra note 146.
156. Id.
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The seller warrants that the thing sold is reasonably fit [for its
ordinary purpose] [for the ordinary use of which such thing is
susceptible] [for its intended use].157
An alternate draft included an additional sentence:
When the seller has reason to know the buyer’s particular purpose
in buying the thing and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill
or judgment in selecting it, the seller warrants the thing selected is
fit for the buyer’s particular purpose.158
Neither alternative contemplated that the general rules of conventional
obligations, rather than the law of redhibition, would govern noncompliance
with the warranty.159 Instead, the proposed articles remained silent on the
matter,160 indicating that the warranty of fitness would be afforded the same
treatment as the warranty of redhibition.
When the Council finally considered the proposed warranty of fitness
article, Professor Litvinoff stated that Louisiana courts recognized the
existence of a warranty of fitness, but he suggested that “it wasn’t clear
from the cases whether the warranty of fitness [was] part of redhibition or
whether it [was] something independent from redhibition.”161 One Council
member opined that a distinction existed between the warranties of fitness
and redhibition and that he therefore saw no danger in bringing U.C.C.
products liability law “through the back door” by enacting an article
expressly providing for the warranty of fitness.162 The Council member
suggested that the warranty of fitness follow redhibition in the Louisiana
Civil Code as another warranty that the seller owes.163 Subsequently,
Professor Litvinoff presented the following revised article on the warranty
of fitness:
The thing sold must be reasonably fit for its ordinary purpose.
When the seller has reason to know the particular use the buyer
intends for the thing, or the buyer’s particular purpose for buying
the thing, and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or
judgment in selecting it, the thing sold must be fit for the buyer’s
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
LA. STATE L. INST., MEETING OF THE COUNCIL, at 4 (May 18–19, 1990).
Id.
Id.
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intended use or for his particular purpose.
If the thing is not so fit, the buyer’s rights are governed by the
general rules of conventional obligations.164
One Council member noted that the article addressed a thing that is
not, in itself, defective and proposed a comment to that effect.165 Another
member moved to adopt the proposed article with a change in the first
paragraph from “purpose” to “use,” and the motion carried—the warranty
of fitness was adopted by the Council.166
The Council may not have fully understood that the new article
incorporated two stand-alone warranties, namely, the warranty of fitness
for ordinary use and the warranty of fitness for particular use.167 The
Council considered the two warranties of fitness, as well as the potential
overlap with redhibition in globo, failing to consider the separate
ramifications of each.168 Given that redhibition already encompassed the
warranty of fitness for ordinary use and that the warranty of fitness for
particular use had not previously existed,169 the Council may have meant
to incorporate the warranty of fitness for particular use but failed to
differentiate it from the warranty of fitness for ordinary use. 170 Although
the Law Institute failed to acknowledge the gravity of its decision,171 a
number of scholars foresaw the complications that the adoption of the
stand-alone warranty of fitness would cause in Louisiana.172
E. Twenty-Five Years Ago: A Prediction Foretold
Even before the legislative enactment of the warranty of fitness
became effective, scholars called for clarification.173 In 1993, Professor
George Bilbe of Loyola Law School wrote an article in which he referred
to article 2524 as “what may be the most significant article in the

164. Id. at 5.
165. Id. The Council did not adopt such a comment. See generally LA. CIV.
CODE art. 2524 (2018).
166. LA. STATE L. INST., supra note 161, at 5.
167. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524.
168. See LA. STATE L. INST., supra note 161.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 152–54.
170. See LA. STATE L. INST., supra note 161.
171. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 cmt. a (2018) (declaring that the
article does not change the law).
172. See, e.g., Bilbe, supra note 20, at 147.
173. See id.
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revision.”174 In examining both the traditional concepts of redhibition and
the newly codified warranties, Bilbe endeavored to locate the provisions
in the revision that needed clarification or refinement.175 Analyzing the
assertion that article 2524 did not change the law, Professor Bilbe
accurately anticipated that “the Law Institute may have done much more
than its comment suggests.”176 He pointed out that “[b]ecause things
having redhibitory defects are ‘useless’ or have significantly diminished
‘usefulness’ or ‘value,’ the legislation contains a definitional overlap in
that the presence of redhibitory defects results in the absence of reasonable
fitness for ordinary use.”177 Bilbe further recognized that the overlap
presented difficulties concerning remedies because the breach of the
warranty of fitness for ordinary use allows recovery of full contract
damages, whereas redhibition limits a buyer’s remedies to return of the
purchase price and incidental expenses.178
Professor Bilbe argued that in cases of good faith sellers of defective
items, a change in the law appeared unavoidable. A good faith seller was
not responsible for damages resulting from redhibitory defects, but under
the new law, the aggrieved buyer could seek damages and dissolution of
the sale under the warranty of fitness for ordinary use.179 Accordingly,
buyers of defective goods would assert that the good faith sellers breached
the warranty of fitness for ordinary use rather than bring a claim in
redhibition.180 Relying on the circular reasoning surrounding the doctrine
of fitness, buyers might argue that if the defects are redhibitory, the goods
will be unfit for ordinary use.181 Bilbe thus envisioned that “the revision
may well afford an alternative more lucrative than an action in redhibition
in every instance where items are affected by redhibitory defects.”182
Indeed, augmenting the warranty of fitness at the expense of redhibition
would yield unacceptable results given redhibition’s fundamental role in
Louisiana law.183
Professor Bilbe also considered whether courts would recognize the
breach of the warranty of fitness for ordinary use in situations that the law

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 138.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 138–39.
Id. at 146–47.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 140.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 140–41.
See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
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of redhibition already remedied.184 He predicted that if courts were to deny
actions for breach of the warranty of fitness for ordinary use when the
unfitness was a result of a redhibitory defect, the warranty of fitness for
ordinary use would apply in relatively few, if any, situations.185 Moreover,
an anomalous situation would exist in which buyers who desired greater
recoveries would assert that the items they purchased were initially
without defects, whereas sellers would contend that the items were
defective on the date of sale.186 Accordingly, Bilbe concluded that “[t]he
issue call[ed] for legislative clarification.”187 Revisiting a number of the
problems he identified, one thing is clear: 25 years later, the evermore
confusing issue continues to call for legislative clarification.188
II. THE FALLOUT
The revised sales law, which went into effect on January 1, 1995,189
was ostensibly only a “facelift” that updated and recast the sales articles
in clear language.190 Despite purporting to leave the foundations of the law
intact,191 the revision has wreaked havoc in the realm of Louisiana’s sales
warranties.192 The recognition of contractual remedies for breach of the
warranty of fitness effected a substantial change in the law, as the
subsequent jurisprudence indicates.193 Whereas before 1995, the warranty
184. Bilbe, supra note 20, at 141.
185. Id.
186. Id. Whereas a cognizable claim in redhibition requires the defect to be
non-apparent, unknown to the buyer, and to have existed at the time of the sale, a
claim for breach of the warranty of fitness has no such requirements. See generally
LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2522, 2524 (2018).
187. Bilbe, supra note 20, at 147.
188. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
189. H.B. 106, 1993 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 841.
190. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 27, § 1:6. Professor Litvinoff
noted, “In spite of their age, the old articles did not deserve to be totally
eliminated. What was needed was a major overhaul; a structural and functional
renovation that left the foundations intact.” Id.
191. The legislature disclaims any intention of changing the law through the
enactment of the warranty of fitness. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. CODE art. 2524
cmt. a (2018) (“This Article is new. It does not change the law, however. It gives
express formulation to the seller’s obligation of delivering to the buyer a thing
that is reasonably fit for its ordinary use. The Louisiana jurisprudence has
recognized the existence of that obligation . . . .”).
192. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 27, § 1:6.
193. Bilbe, supra note 20, at 140. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2018);
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 cmt. a.
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of fitness existed only as “either a jurisprudential gloss on redhibition or
as a casual independent statement of the court on the responsibilities of the
seller,”194 the revision removed fitness from redhibition entirely, resulting
in two independent warranties195 with separate legal frameworks where
there was previously only one.196
Moreover, “warranty of fitness for ordinary use” has not developed an
independent meaning in Louisiana during the last decade.197 No articulable
legislative definition exists, and the jurisprudence is not helpful; courts
prior to revision equated fitness with redhibition, and courts subsequent to
the revision experienced difficulty distinguishing between the
warranties.198 Because of the definitional overlap between ordinary fitness
and redhibition, courts have struggled to determine whether the warranties
are mutually exclusive or, rather, can be breached by the same set of facts,
leaving buyers and sellers across the state subject to vastly different rights
and obligations.199
A. Fitness for Ordinary Use: Codified Confusion
The warranty of fitness for ordinary use is neither an independent nor
a meaningful addition to Louisiana law; it has always been present in the
case law, and its applicability has always been ambiguous.200 Despite the
valiant efforts of the courts,201 the warranty of fitness for ordinary use
remains incompatible with Louisiana law, both doctrinally and

194. Odinet, supra note 62, at 764.
195. Id. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2524.
196. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1994, 1995, 2013, 2524, 2531, 2534, 2541.
197. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
198. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 cmt. a; see, e.g., Sw. La. Hosp. Ass’n v.
BASF Constr. Chems., LLC, 947 F. Supp. 2d 661, 701 (W.D. La. 2013) (“[I]n
contrast, a product is not fit for ordinary use ‘[w]hen the seller has reason to know
the particular use the buyer intends for the thing, or the buyer’s particular purpose
for buying the thing, and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment
in selecting it.’”); Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am.,
Inc., 262 So. 2d 377, 380 (La. 1972) (“Two warranty obligations are inherent in
every sale, the warranty of merchantable title and the warranty of reasonable
fitness for the product’s intended use.”); Jackson v. Breard Motor Co., 167 La.
857, 120 So. 478, 478 (1929) (in a redhibitory action, the court stated,
“Automobile which is not in running condition does not comply with warranty of
fitness for intended purpose”).
199. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
200. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 cmt. a.
201. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 246–50.
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practically,202 in part because it is the product of an entirely different legal
system—the common law system.203 Louisiana imported the common law
concept of ordinary fitness without appreciating that it was already
ingrained in the law and without ascribing to it any independent
meaning.204 In addition, because things having redhibitory defects are, by
definition, useless or have significantly diminished usefulness or value,
the legislation governing the warranties of redhibition and fitness for
ordinary use contains a definitional overlap: the presence of a redhibitory
defect results necessarily in the absence of fitness for ordinary use. 205
Consequently, the warranty of fitness for ordinary use will never develop
in Louisiana where defective goods are governed adequately under the
laws of redhibition.206
Moreover, because the legal frameworks applicable to fitness and
redhibition differ substantially207 and neither the legislation nor the
doctrine provides a sensible distinction between the two, courts have
struggled to set outer limits for the applicability of each warranty.208 The
lack of guidance has caused inevitable inconsistency throughout the
jurisprudence, further intensifying the confusion.209
1. Fitness for Ordinary Use and Redhibition: The Confusing Overlap
To date, no court has articulated an adequate distinction between the
warranties of fitness for ordinary use and redhibition in a way that
facilitates a coherent and reliable enforcement of rights,210 likely because
no meaningful distinction exists. The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of
202. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
203. Since fitness for ordinary use is defined in terms of defects, it has no place
in Louisiana, where the laws of redhibition adequately govern defective goods.
See discussion supra Part I.C.
204. See discussion supra Part I.D.
205. Logically, the presence of a redhibitory defect results in the absence of
fitness for ordinary use. Bilbe, supra note 20, at 147. See H.B. 106, 1993 La. Sess.
Law Serv. Act 841.
206. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
207. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
208. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
209. See, e.g., Cassidy v. Ford Motor Co., No. 15-2483, 2016 WL 687621
(E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2016); Sw. La. Hosp. Ass’n v. BASF Constr. Chems., LLC,
947 F. Supp. 2d 661 (W.D. La. 2013); Justiss Oil Co. v. T3 Energy Servs., Inc.,
No. 1:07-cv-01745, 2011 WL 539135 (W.D. La. Feb. 7, 2011); Fontenot v. Saxby,
34 So. 3d 477 (La. Ct. App. 2010); Cunard Line Co. v. Datrex, Inc., 926 So. 2d
109 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
210. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
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Appeal set forth the best attempt at a distinction between the warranties in
Cunard Limited Line Co. v. Datrex, Inc., stating, “[W]e conclude that
[article 2524] applies to a situation in which the cause of action is based,
not on the defective nature of the thing at issue, but on its fitness for
ordinary use and/or for a particular use or purpose.”211 The court’s
language suggests that a thing is unfit for use only if it is not also
defective.212
In Cunard, the court addressed a dispute over the applicable
prescriptive period for an action related to defective lighting systems on
cruise ships.213 Cunard Line Co. (“Cunard”) purchased lighting systems
from Datrex for installation on its cruise ships to comply with International
Maritime Organization regulations.214 Following installation, Cunard sued
Datrex, alleging that a number of problems developed immediately,
“including, but not limited to, shorting out” and also that the Coast Guard
found the systems did not comply with safety standards.215
On appeal, Cunard argued that the warranty of fitness provided an
alternative cause of action for defective products—along with an
additional prescriptive period of ten years—to a cause of action in
redhibition.216 Cunard argued that its claim fell within the ambit of article
2524 for two reasons: (1) the Datrex system was unfit for ordinary use on
a cruise ship; and (2) it relied on Datrex’s skill in selecting the system, and
Datrex was aware that Cunard’s particular purpose for installing the
system was compliance with the regulations.217 In essence, Cunard argued
that its claim fell under the warranty of fitness for either ordinary or
particular use.218 The court disagreed, noting that Cunard’s cause of action
arose out of the allegedly defective condition of the lighting systems.219 It
211. Cunard Line Co., 926 So. 2d at 114.
212. Id. See also Stroderd v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., No. 04-3050, 2005
WL 2037419, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 2005) (“[A] breach of contract of fitness for
ordinary use claim is only an independent cause of action when an item is free
from redhibitory defects.”); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Indus. Laminates Corp., 664 F.2d
1332, 1335 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he courts in Louisiana have held unequivocally
that actions based on a breach of warranty against defects are to be brought in
redhibition instead of as a breach of contract.”).
213. Cunard Line Co., 926 So. 2d 109.
214. Id. at 111.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 112.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 113. The court found significance in Cunard’s failure to demonstrate
that a properly functioning Datrex system would fail to meet either International
Maritime Organization requirements or Cunard’s needs or purposes. Id.
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concluded that the systems were not suitable for ordinary use or for
Cunard’s particular purpose because they were defective, which put his
claim squarely within the ambit of redhibition.220 Rather than clarifying
what warranty of fitness for ordinary use meant or was intended to address,
the court explained only what the warranty did not mean, emphasizing that
the warranty of fitness for ordinary use is not another version of the
warranty of redhibition.221
In contrast, many decisions equate breach of the warranty of fitness
with the existence of a defect in the thing.222 The Exposé des Motifs
accompanying the Sales Revision cites multiple cases as authority223 for
the proposition that prior to the revision, judges formulated a warranty of
fitness that was seemingly indistinguishable from the warranty against
latent defects.224 Indeed, even the two cases that the Exposé des Motifs
220. Id. Unlike the breach of warranty of fitness for ordinary use, the breach
of the warranty of fitness for particular use is not dependent on the existence of a
defect. The existence of a defect, however, may put a buyer’s claim within the
ambit of redhibition as opposed to fitness for particular use. See generally LA.
CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2524 (2018).
221. Cunard Line Co., 926 So. 2d at 113.
222. LA. STATE L. INST., supra note 146, at 5 (prepared for Meeting of the
Council by Saul Litvinoff, Reporter).
223. See, e.g., Crawford v. Abbott Auto. Co., 101 So. 871 (La. 1924) (“Unless
warranty be expressly waived, the vendor warrants that the thing sold is fit for the
purpose intended.”); Jackson v. Breard Motor Co., 120 So. 478, 479 (La. 1929)
(“Automobile which is not in running condition does not comply with warranty
of fitness for intended purpose.”) (the action was one in redhibition); Falk v. Luke
Motor Co., 112 So. 2d 683, 989 (La. 1959) (“[A]s is commonly known, a car
which will not run or which runs intermittently, requiring the frequent attention
of a mechanic to keep it going is an abomination and is manifestly not fit or
acceptable for the purposes intended.”); Bartolotta v. Gambino, 78 So. 2d 208,
211–12 (La. Ct. App. 1955) (“[A]ll that the buyer need show is the actual
existence of such defects as render[ed] the article unsuitable for its intended
uses.”); Cosey v. Cambre, 204 So. 2d 97, 100 (La. Ct. App. 1967) (“[P]urchaser
of an automobile is entitled to receive a vehicle which will meet his needs, and
[a] car which is not in running condition is not fit for the purposes intended by the
buyer.”); Craig v. Burch, 228 So. 2d 723, 728 (La. Ct. App. 1969) (“[V]endor
warrants the thing sold to be fit for its intended purpose.”); Radalec Inc. v.
Automatic Firing Corp., 81 So. 2d 830 (La. 1955) (in which the defense to the suit
is founded on three grounds, one of which being that the action of redhibition will
not lie because the implied warranty of fitness of the units has been fulfilled);
Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 262 So. 2d 377
(La. 1972) (“[T]he rule may also be applied . . . to new automobile that proves
unfit for use because of latent defects.”).
224. H.B. 106, 1993 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 841.
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cites as recognizing a stand-alone warranty of fitness225 did not
meaningfully distinguish between ordinary fitness and redhibition.226
Instead, the court in both cases made broad statements regarding the
warranty of fitness alongside traditional declarations about redhibition.227
In Rey v. Cuccia, the buyer of a camper-trailer sought to recover from
the seller on grounds of redhibition because the trailer had come apart
shortly after being put to use.228 After conducting a typical redhibition
analysis, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated, “In Louisiana sales, the seller
is bound by an implied warranty that the thing sold is free of hidden defects
and is reasonably fit for the product’s intended use.”229 Although the court
acknowledged that both warranties are implied in every sale, it failed to
recognize any rights or duties the warranty of fitness creates beyond those
imposed under the warranty of redhibition, concluding that the trailer
contained redhibitory defects at the time of the sale.230 Thus, even if the
court named the warranty of fitness separate from the warranty of
redhibition, such nominal recognition did not affect the case’s outcome.231
Subsequently, in Hob’s Refrigeration & Air Conditioning, Inc. v.
Poche, the seller of a home-air conditioner compressor sued to recover on
an open account.232 On appeal, the litigants disputed the duration, rather
than the existence or breach, of the warranty of fitness.233 Citing Rey, the
Louisiana Supreme Court again stated that “the seller is bound by an
implied warranty that the thing sold is free of hidden defects and is
reasonably fit for the product’s intended use.”234 The court affirmed the
225. Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So. 2d 840 (La. 1974); Hob’s Refrigeration & Air
Conditioning v. Poche, 293 So. 2d 546 (La. 1974).
226. H.B. 106, 1993 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 841. If anything, these two cases
depict the Louisiana Supreme Court’s embracement of the warranty of fitness for
particular use (as opposed to ordinary use). See discussion infra note 234.
227. Odinet, supra note 62, at 762.
228. Rey, 298 So. 2d at 840.
229. Id. at 842. The Court also established that where a thing becomes unfit
for its intended purpose during normal and foreseeable use, and no abnormal and
unforeseeable use or intervening cause is proven, a strong inference arises that the
thing contained a defect, regardless of whether the actual cause of the unfitness or
defect is proven. Id. at 845.
230. Bilbe, supra note 20, at 138; see Rey, 298 So. 2d at 840.
231. Rey, 298 So. 2d at 845.
232. Hob’s Refrigeration & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Poche, 304 So. 2d 326
(La. 1974).
233. Id. at 327.
234. Id. In both Rey and Hob’s Refrigeration, the Court stated that the product
must be “reasonably fit for [its] intended use.” Rey, 298 So. 2d at 842; Hob’s, 304
So. 2d at 327 (emphasis added). Arguably, then, the Introduction is correct that
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trial court’s finding that the compressor did not comply with the implied
warranty of fitness with which it was purchased because “[a] compressor
purchased for $450 for a home-air conditioner should reasonably be
expected to last longer than three months, even though purchased as a
rebuilt unit.”235 Again, the court acknowledged no difference in the law
governing fitness and redhibition.236 Hob’s Refrigeration offers only a
minor contribution to a legal understanding of the warranty of fitness; it
merely conveys that a thing reasonably fit for its ordinary purpose should
be “reasonably expected to last.”237
This senseless rhetoric, though problematic, is not inexplicable given
the lack of legislative guidance as to the relationship between the
warranties of fitness for ordinary use and redhibition.238 A plain reading of
the articles reveals nothing about the interplay between redhibition and
fitness.239 The commentary to the warranty of fitness article provides that
“when the thing sold is not fit for its ordinary use, even though it is free
from redhibitory defects, the buyer may seek dissolution of the sale and
damages, or just damages, under the general rules of conventional
obligations.”240 In such a case, the buyer’s action is one for breach of
contract rather than redhibition.241 This language suggests that the
warranty of fitness applies only when the warranty of redhibition does not.
In other words, being “unfit for ordinary use” excludes defective things.242
On the other hand, the warranty of kind and quality, which the legislature
also adopted during the revision, provides expressly that preference is to
be given to the warranty of redhibition over the warranty set forth therein,
clearly indicating that the two warranties are separate and distinct.243 If the
legislature intended for the same inference to apply to the warranty of
fitness, it would have likely included the same explicit language.244 The

the two cases created a stand-alone warranty of fitness—the warranty of fitness
for particular use. See H.B. 106, 1993 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 841.
235. Hob’s Refrigeration, 304 So. 2d at 328.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 210–21; see also infra text
accompanying notes 239-50.
239. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2524 (2018).
240. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 cmt. b (2018) (emphasis added).
241. Id.
242. See id.
243. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2529.
244. Id. (“When the thing the seller has delivered, though in itself free from
redhibitory defects . . . .”).
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ambiguous language set forth in the Code, however, provides little guidance
as to the interplay between the warranties of fitness and redhibition.245
It is difficult, if not impossible, to find an example of a thing that is
not defective but is unfit for ordinary use, although some courts have tried
to force a distinction in accordance with the structure of the Code.246 In
Cunard, for example, the issue of whether the warranty of fitness was
intended to encompass the warranty against redhibitory defects, providing
an additional cause of action for defective products, was res nova before
the Louisiana Third Circuit.247 After construing the statute and considering
legislative intent, the court found that the legislature intended to separate
and categorize the different types of warranties applicable to sales rather
than have all such warranties placed in the category of redhibition by
default,248 noting that:
It is apparent that the legislature intended by Act 841 to address
and clarify any confusion between the warranty against
redhibitory defects and the warranty of fitness for ordinary use
and/or for a particular use or purpose by enacting La. Civ. Code
art. 2524 as a separate and distinct Article from La. Civ. Code art.
2520. It would appear superfluous or redundant for the legislature
to have enacted two warranty statutes addressing the same subject
matter, with no mention or indication of its reasoning for the
overlap, such as to provide for an election of remedies and
prescriptive periods.249
Evidently, the court felt compelled to give the warranty of fitness for
ordinary use independent meaning, even though the revision purported not
to change the law, and even though it is almost impossible to formulate a
distinction.250

245. See generally id. arts. 2520, 2524.
246. See, e.g., Cunard Line Co. v. Datrex, Inc., 926 So. 2d 109 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
247. Id. at 113.
248. Id. at 114.
249. Id. at 113–14.
250. Id. Under this approach, the warranty of fitness applies exclusively to
things that do not suffer from redhibitory defects but are otherwise unfit for
ordinary use. Id. This approach begs the question of how something can be free
from defects prohibiting its use or substantially diminishing its usefulness or value
but simultaneously be unfit for its ordinary use. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts.
2520, 2524.
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2. The Consequence of the Overlap: Effects of Classification
The lack of a meaningful distinction between a thing unfit for ordinary
use and one that suffers from a redhibitory defect would be of little
consequence if the legislature had subjected the breach of the warranty of
fitness for ordinary use to the same treatment as the breach of the warranty
against redhibition. The distinction, though intellectually puzzling, would
have no practical importance. Regardless of the source of the seller’s
liability, the result would be the same in terms of remedies and time
limitations.251 Rather than align the frameworks of fitness and redhibition,
however, the legislature imposed a separate framework for fitness such
that the pertinent rights, obligations, and remedies available to parties vary
depending on the classification of their claim.252
To prevail in an action for redhibition, the buyer must establish a
number of elements: (1) that a redhibitory defect existed in the thing
sold;253 (2) that he neither knew of the defect nor was it apparent;254 (3)
that the defect existed at the time of delivery;255 and (4) that the seller could
251. See id. arts. 2520–22, 2524, 2530–32, 2534, 2537–38, 2540–2541, 2545,
2548.
252. See id.
253. Id. art. 2520. A defect is redhibitory when: (1) “it renders the thing
useless, or its use so inconvenient that it must be presumed that a buyer would not
have bought the thing had he known of the defect”; or (2) “without rendering the
thing totally useless, it diminishes its usefulness or its value so that it must be
presumed that a buyer would still have bought it but for a lesser price.” Id.
Apparent defects are not redhibitory vices. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2521 cmt. a
(2018).
254. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2521 (“The seller owes no warranty for defects in the
thing that were known to the buyer at the time of the sale, or for defects that should
have been discovered by a reasonably prudent buyer of such things.”). Apparent
defects are not redhibitory vices. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2521 cmt. a. An
“apparent defect” is one that a reasonably prudent buyer, acting under similar
circumstances, would discover by simple inspection of the thing. Royal v. Cook,
984 So. 2d 156, 163 (La. Ct. App. 2008). In determining whether an inspection is
reasonable, a court should consider the buyer’s knowledge and expertise,
opportunity for inspection, and assurances the seller made. Id. But see LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 2521 cmt. d (“Under this Article the buyer must make more than
a casual observation of the object; he must examine the thing to ascertain its
soundness.”). Regardless of the gravity of the defects, the seller is not responsible
for defects of which the buyer was aware, either because the seller disclosed it or
because the buyer discovered it himself. Id. art. 2521 cmts. b, f.
255. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2530. The defect is presumed to have existed at the
time of delivery if it appears within three days. Id. Even if a defect appears after
three days from the date of delivery, the nature of the defect may allow the court
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not or would not correct the defect when given the opportunity to do so.256
A buyer with a successful redhibition claim257 is entitled to either
rescission of the sale or reduction of the purchase price, depending on the
nature and extent of the defect.258 As long as the seller had no actual
knowledge of the defect, the buyer must give him notice and an
opportunity to repair the defect,259 and the seller is bound to do so.260 If the
seller fails to repair or remedy the defect, he must return the purchase price
with interest and pay a reimbursement for the reasonable expenses
occasioned by the sale and preservation of the thing.261 If the seller knew
of the redhibitory defect, he is liable to the buyer for the return of the
purchase price together with interest, reimbursement, damages, and
attorney fees.262 A seller who is liable in redhibition likewise has an action
against the manufacturer of the thing for any loss sustained because of the
redhibitory defect.263

to draw an inference that it existed at the time of delivery. LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 2530 cmt. c. See, e.g., Perrin v. Read Imports, Inc., 359 So. 2d 738, 741 n.1
(La. Ct. App. 1978) (“Later-appearing defects do not enjoy that status as a matter
of law, but in the absence of other explanation, defects which do not usually result
from ordinary use for the time passed may be inferred to have pre-existed the
sale.”) (citation omitted).
256. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2522 (unless the seller has actual knowledge of the
existence of a redhibitory defect, the buyer must give the seller timely notice of
the defect as to allow him the opportunity to make repairs); id. art. 2531 (a seller
who did not know that the thing he sold had a redhibitory defect is bound to repair
or correct it).
257. The law of redhibition precludes a buyer who knew or should have known
of the redhibitory defect from obtaining any form of relief. Id. art. 2521.
258. Id. art. 2520. A buyer may choose to seek only a reduction of the price
even when the redhibitory defect is one giving him the right to obtain rescission
of the sale. Id. art. 2541. On the other hand, when a buyer seeks rescission of a
sale on the grounds of redhibition, the court may limit the buyer’s remedy to a
reduction of the price. Id.
259. Id. arts. 2522, 2531.
260. Id. art. 2531.
261. See id. art. 2522 (“A buyer who fails to give that notice suffers diminution
of the warranty to the extent the seller can show that the defect could have been
repaired or that the repairs would have been less burdensome, had he received
timely notice.”).
262. Id. art. 2545. The buyer is not required to give notice to a seller who has actual
knowledge of the existence of a redhibitory defect in the thing sold. Id. art. 2522.
263. Id. art. 2531. This warranty cannot be waived. Id. Any contractual
provision attempting to limit or diminish recovery by a seller against the
manufacturer has no effect. Id.
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Unlike the warranty of redhibition, the general rules of conventional
obligations govern the warranty of fitness.264 Accordingly, a buyer may
obtain dissolution of the sale and recover compensatory damages265 that
the seller’s failure to comply with the warranty causes.266 A bad faith seller
is liable for all damages, foreseeable or not,267 that are a direct
consequence of his failure to perform.268 A buyer must make reasonable
efforts to mitigate the damage the seller’s nonperformance causes; if he
fails to do so, the seller may demand that the damages be reduced
accordingly.269 A buyer who concealed facts from the seller that he knew
or should have known would cause a failure of performance may not
recover damages.270 If the buyer’s negligence contributed to the failure to
perform, the damages are reduced in proportion to the buyer’s
negligence.271 Generally, a buyer who alleges breach of warranty of fitness
may not recover attorney fees.272
The legislature’s failure to align the frameworks of fitness and redhibition
has required courts to tease out the distinctions between redhibition and fitness
for ordinary use to determine the scope and nature of a seller’s liability—an
impossibly arduous burden.273 Various courts have questioned whether a
seller may be held liable for breach of warranty of fitness and breach of
warranty against redhibitory defects simultaneously,274 but unfortunately,

264. Id.
265. Damages consist of the loss the buyer sustained and the profit of which
he was deprived. Id. art. 1995
266. Id. arts. 1994, 1995, 2013.
267. “Foreseeable damages are such damages as may fall within the foresight
of a reasonable man.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1996 cmt. b (2018).
268. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1997. Under general contract law, a bad faith obligor
“intentionally and maliciously fails to perform his obligation,” as opposed to a
bad faith seller under redhibition, who knows of the defect but fails to declare it.
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1997 cmt. b; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2545.
269. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2002.
270. Id. art. 2003.
271. Id.
272. It is well-settled in Louisiana that attorney fees are not recoverable unless
a statute or contract clearly provides for them. See, e.g., Kiefer v. Bernie Dumas
Buick Co., 210 So. 2d 569 (La. Ct. App. 1968).
273. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
274. See, e.g., 425 Notre Dame, LLC v. Kolbe & Kolbe Mill Work Co., No.
15-454, 2016 WL 1110232, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 22, 2016); Cassidy v. Ford Motor
Co., No. 15-2483, 2016 WL 687621, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2016); Sw. La. Hosp.
Ass’n v. BASC Constr. Chems., LLC, 947 F. Supp. 2d 661 (W.D. La. 2013);
Justiss Oil Co. v. T3 Energy Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-01745, 2011 WL 539135,
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courts have remained split on the issue. Resolution of the controversy is
essential, as it dictates the applicable legal framework.275
According to numerous Louisiana decisions, when a cause of action is
based on a defect, the buyer is limited to recovery under the laws of
redhibition, and he may not disguise his grievance as a fitness claim in an
effort to take advantage of the more favorable law.276 When courts hold
that the warranty of fitness is entirely distinct from the warranty of
redhibition,277 redhibition subsumes any otherwise pertinent fitness claim
because the causes of action are mutually exclusive.278 In Cunard, for
example, the court held that when a buyer’s action is based on the
allegedly defective nature of the thing, his recovery is limited to the
prescriptive period for redhibition, and he may not bring a claim in fitness
to avail himself of the longer prescriptive period.279 Additionally, in the
2014 decision of Mouton v. General Power Systems, Inc., the Louisiana
Third Circuit Court of Appeal noted that a generator that “began to show
signs that it was defective . . . has proven defective for purposes of
Louisiana redhibition law[,]” and thus, the buyer’s cause of action lied in
redhibition.280 Accordingly, the court held that the ten-year prescriptive
period for conventional obligations was inapplicable.281
at *5 (W.D. La. Feb. 7, 2011); Cunard Line Co. v. Datrex, Inc., 926 So. 2d 109
(La. Ct. App. 2006).
275. See sources cited supra note 274.
276. See, e.g., Stroderd v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., No. 04-3040, 2005
WL 2037419, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 2005) (“Plaintiffs claim for breach of
contract of fitness for ordinary use fails for an independent reason as well: it is
subsumed by Louisiana redhibition law.”); Mouton v. Generac Power Sys., Inc.,
152 So. 3d 985, 990 (La. Ct. App. 2014); Cunard Line Ltd. Co., 926 So. 2d at 114.
277. See, e.g., Cunard Line Co., 926 So. 2d at 109; Mouton, 152 So. 3d at 990;
Chesapeake La., L.P. v. Innovative Wellsite Sys., Inc., No. 12-2963, 2014 WL
5796794, at *5 (W.D. La. Nov. 6, 2014).
278. For example, in 2014, a federal district court held similarly that if a
product suffers from redhibitory defects, a party’s claims for breach of warranty
of fitness are subsumed by his claim for breach of warranty against redhibitory
defects. Chesapeake, 2014 WL 5796794, at *5.
279. Cunard Line Co., 926 So. 2d at 114. See also Stroderd, 2005 WL
2037419, at *3 (“[The] claim of breach of contract of fitness for ordinary use fails
for an independent reason as well: it is subsumed by Louisiana redhibition law.”);
Mouton, 152 So. 3d at 990; Hollybrook Cottonseed Processing, LLC v. Carver,
Inc., 2010 WL 892869, at *8 (W.D. La. 2010); Mumford v. Jackson Nat. Life Ins.
Co., 2007 WL 7711472, at *4 (La. Ct. App. 2007); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Indus.
Laminates Corp., 664 F.2d 1332, 1335 (5th Cir. 1982).
280. Mouton, 152 So. 3d at 991.
281. Id.
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On the other hand, when courts hold that the warranties of fitness and
redhibition are not mutually exclusive, the buyer essentially gets two bites
at the apple.282 Indeed, a number of federal district courts have held that,
so long as the shorter prescriptive period for redhibition has not expired,
the plaintiff may bring an additional claim for breach of warranty of
fitness.283 In Southwest Louisiana Hospital Association v. BASC
Construction Chemicals, LLC, for example, a federal district court stated,
“[C]laims for breach of contract for fitness of ordinary use and for
redhibition are not mutually exclusive; thus, when a party alleges that a
product has a redhibitory defect, it may also argue that the redhibitory
defect rendered the product unfit for its ordinary use.”284 This
authorization allows a buyer multiple avenues of recovery for the same
defect and thus creates doubt as to the obligations between the buyer and
the seller.285
282. See sources cited infra note 283.
283. See, e.g., 425 Notre Dame, LLC v. Kolbe & Kolbe Mill Work Co., Inc.,
No. 15-454, 2016 WL 1110232, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 22, 2016); Cassidy v. Ford
Motor Co., No. 15-2483, 2016 WL 687621, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2016); Sw.
La. Hosp. Ass’n v. BASC Constr. Chems., LLC, 947 F. Supp. 2d 661, 690 (W.D.
La. 2013); Justiss Oil Co. v. T3 Energy Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-01745, 2011 WL
539135, at *5 (W.D. La. Feb. 7, 2011).
284. Sw. La. Hosp Ass’n, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 690, 690–92 (“[The] one-year
prescriptive period on the Hospital’s redhibition claim has not expired, and thus
the Hospital is free to assert claims under both art. 2520 and art. 2524 in the
absence of conflicting prescriptive periods.”). In the same opinion, the court
interpreted Cunard as standing for the proposition that fitness and redhibition are
“separate and distinct” causes of action that could be present in an action
collectively or individually. Id. at 700. According to the court, “The crucial
consideration is what type of issue a buyer has with a product in determining
whether the warranty of redhibition or the warranty of fitness applies.” Id. By that
theory, if a product is unfit for ordinary use because of a redhibitory defect, the
buyer would be limited to a cause of action in redhibition. Id.
285. See infra text accompanying notes 286–93. Some courts have tried to
force different, similarly unsatisfactory distinctions between fitness and
redhibition. See, e.g., Mire v. Eatelcorp, Inc., 927 So. 2d 1113, 1118 (La. Ct. App.
2005) (holding that a redhibitory defect is a characteristic or component of the
thing sold, rather than the entire thing itself, whereas if the thing “is by its nature
not reasonably fit for its ordinary or intended use,” the rights of the buyer are
governed by the rules of conventional obligations as opposed to redhibition).
Other courts have mistakenly conflated the warranties of fitness and redhibition.
See, e.g., 425 Notre Dame, 2016 WL 1110232, at *4 (“The warranty of fitness is
closely related to the warranty against redhibitory defects. . . . Because the same
law applies to both warranties, the Court will discuss them together.”). Still others,
including the Louisiana Supreme Court, have yet to rule on the issue.
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Although Professor Litvinoff’s proposed comments could have helped
clarify the scope of each warranty’s application, they were not
incorporated into the official comments, thereby intensifying the
problem.286 Litvinoff’s commentary explained that: (1) the warranty of
fitness applies in every sale irrespective of whether the thing is defective;
and (2) the warranty of fitness applies regardless of whether the sale is
subject to rescission on the grounds of redhibition.287 Under this regime,
the buyer could seek rescission under redhibition and contractual damages
under the warranty of fitness.288 On the other hand, when the warranty of
fitness was proposed to the Law Institute Council, one member of the
Council noted that the article addressed a thing that is not, in itself,
defective.289 Under this view, the buyer would only have a cause of action
for breach of warranty of fitness for a product that was not otherwise
defective.290 Either approach would have provided a definitive answer.291
In the law’s current state, however, it remains unclear whether the
legislature intended to recognize violations of the warranty of fitness in
situations in which remedies exist under the law of redhibition.292 By
default, then, the courts have been left to resolve the uncertainty,
producing results that have been less than satisfactory. Under the current
state of the law, similarly situated parties remain subject to different
prescriptive periods, burdens of proof, and remedies depending on
whether the court decides to treat the warranties of fitness and redhibition
as mutually exclusive or as concurrent causes of action.293

286. LA. STATE L. INST., supra note 146, at 7 (prepared for Meeting of the
Council by Saul Litvinoff, Reporter). Although the proposed comments would have
clarified confusion as to the overlap between the warranties of fitness and
redhibition, the comments would not have solved the problem of allowing the buyer
two shots at recovery. Id. Thus, although the comments would have made the
relationship between the warranties clearer, the law would still be unfair. Id.
287. Id. If these comments had been adopted and made clear that the remedies
co-exist, buyers would be entitled to recover twice for the same defect under the
warranty of fitness for ordinary use, which is problematic. The comments would
clarify the law regarding the warranty of fitness for particular use, which may apply
to a product that is not defective in itself but not fit for the buyer’s particular use.
288. Id.
289. LA. STATE L. INST., supra note 161, at 5.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Bilbe, supra note 20, at 141.
293. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2521, 2522, 2530, 2534 (2018);
see also discussion supra Part II.A.2.
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B. Fitness for Particular Use: A Meaningful Addition to Louisiana Law
Whereas adoption of the warranty of fitness for ordinary use was
unnecessary in light of prior Louisiana jurisprudence,294 the warranty of
fitness for particular use was an important contribution to Louisiana’s law
of sales. Unlike the questionable applicability of the warranty of fitness
for ordinary use,295 it is easy to imagine a situation in which a thing is free
from redhibitory defects but nonetheless unfit for particular use.296 For
example, suppose that Betty Buyer from the earlier hypothetical was a
photographer looking for a printer capable of printing her photographs. If
the printer does not catch fire, but instead is incapable of printing on photo
paper, the printer does not suffer from a redhibitory defect—it remains a
fully functional printer.297 Nonetheless, it is unfit for Betty’s particular
purpose of printing pictures.298
In a jurisprudential example, Downs v. Hammett, Downs bought a
piece of immovable property, intending to subdivide the land into four
tracts to be used for homes for herself and her children.299 She later
executed an act of exchange with Hammett Properties, Inc. (“Hammett”),
in which she exchanged her house and a promissory note for the 3.947acre tract of land.300 After the exchange, Downs learned that an ordinance
restricted the subdivision of her land to tracts consisting of a minimum of
1.25 acres each, making it impossible for her to subdivide her land in
accordance with her original plan.301
On appeal, Downs alleged that Hammett knew of the ordinance that
made the property unsuitable for her intended use but sold her the property
anyway and thus defrauded her.302 The court ultimately did not apply the
warranty of fitness for particular use because Downs did not allege that
she relied on the skill or judgment of the seller in selecting the tract of
294. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
295. See Part II.A.1.
296. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2524.
297. See generally id. Likewise, the printer remains fit for its ordinary use of
printing.
298. Id. As long as Betty could prove that Suzie has knowledge of her
particular purpose—to print pictures—and that Betty was relying on her expertise
in selecting the printer, Betty would have a viable claim under the warranty of
fitness for particular use. Id. art. 2524.
299. Downs v. Hammett Properties, Inc., 899 So. 2d 792, 793 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 796. The court noted that “[a]n ordinance that restricts the
subdivision of property is not a ‘defect’ or ‘vice’ in the ‘thing sold’ within the
meaning of [article 2520]; it is merely a restriction on the use of the property.” Id.
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land; however, the court did acknowledge that the law recognizes a cause
of action against the seller when such reliance exists.303 The warranty of
fitness for particular use thus carries an independent purpose: providing
remedies to buyers of non-defective things that do not meet their
expectations.304
In contrast to the ambiguous warranty of fitness for ordinary use, the
warranty of fitness for particular use is readily applicable to sales outside
the scope of redhibition.305 The Louisiana Civil Code explicitly provides
two prerequisites that trigger the warranty of fitness for particular use: (1)
the seller must have reason to know the buyer’s particular use for the thing
or the buyer’s particular purpose for buying it; and (2) the seller must have
reason to know that the buyer is relying on his skill or judgment in
selecting the thing.306 Despite this clear legislative guidance, courts
struggle to impute meaning into the meaningless warranty of fitness for
ordinary use,307 which may inhibit the warranty of fitness for particular use
from development.

303. Id.
304. Id.
305. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
306. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2018). Although the Code provides adequate
guidance for separating the warranties of fitness for particular and ordinary use,
some courts have conflated the two concepts. See, e.g., 425 Notre Dame, LLC v.
Kolbe & Kolbe Mill Work Co., Inc., No. 15-454, 2016 WL 1110232, at *4 (E.D.
La. Mar. 22, 2016) (“The warranty of fitness is closely related to the warranty
against redhibitory defects. . . . Because the same law applies to both warranties,
the Court will discuss them together.”); see also Sw. La. Hosp. Ass’n v. BASC
Constr. Chems., LLC, 947 F. Supp. 2d 690, 701 (W.D. La. 2013) (purporting to
set forth a distinction between a redhibitory defect and the warranty of fitness for
ordinary use but was painstakingly confused about the difference in fitness for
ordinary and particular use). Citing article 2524, the Southwest Louisiana
Hospital Ass’n court stated, “[I]n contrast, a product is not fit for ordinary use
‘[w]hen the seller has reason to know the particular use the buyer intends for the
thing, or the buyer’s particular purpose for buying the thing, and that the buyer is
relying on the seller’s skill or judgment in selecting it.’” Id. It appears the courts
that are confusing the two warranties of fitness are reading article 2524
conjunctively as opposed to disjunctively, thus merging the warranties of fitness
for ordinary and particular use into a single warranty.
307. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
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III. SOLUTION: REPEAL OF THE WARRANTY OF FITNESS
FOR ORDINARY USE
The warranty of fitness for ordinary use has no place in Louisiana
law.308 The warranty has never had any independent meaning prior to or
since the 1995 revision and has only spurred uncertainty among the
courts.309 The artificial classification scheme between ordinary fitness and
redhibition subjects similarly situated parties to different prescriptive
periods, measures of damages, and remedies for inexecution, which is
highly undesirable.310
Even when courts correctly recognize that warranty of fitness and
redhibition are the same, the law remains problematic because election of
remedies undermines redhibition.311 A thing that suffers from a redhibitory
defect will likewise be unfit for ordinary use,312 and in most cases, a breach
of the warranty of fitness entitles the buyer to seek damages, as well as
dissolution of the sale, a broader remedy than is provided under
redhibition.313 Unlike the warranty of redhibition, with its numerous
requirements and exclusive remedies, Louisiana Civil Code article 2524 is
short and open-ended.314 Consequently, buyers are incentivized to pursue
an action under breach of warranty of fitness rather than redhibition when
both causes of action exist.315
Thus, the existence of the warranty of fitness for ordinary use as a
stand-alone warranty detracts from redhibition, which is at the heart of
Louisiana sales law.316 After decades of development, redhibition strikes
the proper balance between buyers and sellers by providing specific rules
exclusive to sales.317 As early as 1966, it was recognized that “[t]he
historical reason for application of this shorter [redhibitory] prescription
period . . . is the practical necessity to determine promptly and certainly

308. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
309. See discussion supra Parts I.B.2 & II.A.1.
310. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
311. If warranty of fitness for ordinary use and redhibition mean the same
thing, the buyer can elect to bring his claim under either cause of action.
312. Bilbe, supra note 20, at 140.
313. Larissa Teipner, The Damage Carve-Out of the Louisiana Products
Liability Act: Are Manufacturers Potentially Liable for Warranty of Fitness?, 70
LA. L. REV. 615, 625 (2010).
314. Odinet, supra note 62, at 764.
315. Teipner, supra note 313, at 624. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
316. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
317. Odinet, supra note 62, at 767.
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whether the article sold did or did not have the vices claimed.”318 Because
redhibition is deeply embedded in the civil law,319 its preservation is vital.
Accordingly, buyers should not be given the choice between fitness for
ordinary use and redhibition for the same defect.320 If given the choice,
buyers will almost always choose to bring their claims under the warranty
of fitness, which will lead necessarily to the unwelcome demise of
redhibition.321
Louisiana could avoid these problems if the law of redhibition
governed all issues concerning things unfit for ordinary use without
concern for whether the items are “defective.” Courts should address
products that are not defective, but otherwise not up to the buyer’s
particular standards, under the umbrella of general contract law using the
warranty of fitness for particular use.322 To accomplish this objective, the
legislature must repeal the warranty of fitness for ordinary use. Repealing
the warranty of fitness for ordinary use will promote clarity and uniformity
throughout the law of sales in Louisiana without detracting from the
substantive law.
Because the warranty of redhibition already encompasses breach of
fitness for ordinary use,323 a repeal of ordinary fitness will not undermine
the substantive law. As Professor Litvinoff recognized, “[A]ll situations
falling under the U.C.C. warranty of fitness are contemplated by the
Louisiana Civil Code as instances covered either by the warranty of
redhibition or as breach of contract.”324 In other words, even when a buyer
cannot point to a particular physical defect or underlying cause of a
product’s malfunction, if the product proves to be unfit for use because it
is defective, the buyer may bring a claim in redhibition.325 Hence, repeal
will marry the warranties of redhibition and fitness for ordinary use rather

318. Victory Oil Co. v. Perret, 183 So. 2d 360, 363 (La. Ct. App. 1966). See
also Justiss Oil Co. v. T3 Energy Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 539135, at *5 (W.D. La.
2011) (“[Permitting] the plaintiff to proceed on the contractually based warranty
of fitness with its 10 year prescriptive period would have entirely vitiated the
protections of Louisiana’s comparatively brief one year prescriptive period under
the warranty against redhibitory defects.”).
319. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
320. See supra text accompanying note 315.
321. See discussion supra part I.B.1.
322. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2524 (2018).
323. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
324. LA. STATE L. INST., supra note 146, at 7 (prepared for Meeting of the
Council by Saul Litvinoff, Reporter).
325. See, e.g., Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So. 2d 840 (La. 1974).
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than abolish the concept of fitness for ordinary use.326 The goal of
consolidating the warranties is to direct Louisiana courts to interpret
redhibition broadly so as to encompass breaches of fitness for ordinary use
without concern of importing general contract law to situations that ought
to remain under redhibition.327
The warranty of fitness for particular use should remain as an
independent cause of action for breach of contract.328 This warranty does
not generate any of the problems that the warranty of fitness for ordinary
use creates.329 Courts still must distinguish between the existence of a
redhibitory defect and a breach of the warranty of fitness for particular use,
but this distinction is intuitive, with relevant articles providing sufficient
guidelines on each.330 Furthermore, because the legislation provides clear
guidance as to the scope of the warranty’s application such that it is
applicable only when the additional elements are met,331 the use of the
warranty of fitness for ordinary use alleviates the concern of undermining
redhibition. Additionally, repeal of fitness for ordinary use will let fitness
for particular use stand alone, making it easier for courts to appreciate that
it is a separate warranty, distinct from redhibition.332 Indeed, repealing
ordinary fitness is necessary to give fitness for particular use an opportunity
to develop.333
326. See generally discussion supra Parts II.A.1–2.
327. See generally discussion supra Parts II.A.1–2.
328. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2018).
329. See infra text accompanying note 330.
330. To prevail in an action for redhibition, the purchaser must establish the
following: (1) that the thing sold contains a defect that renders it absolutely useless
or that diminishes its usefulness so that it must be presumed that a buyer would
still have bought it but for a lesser price (LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520); (2) that the
defect existed at the time of delivery; (id. art. 2530); (3) that the defect was neither
known by him nor apparent (id. art. 2521); and (4) that the seller could not, or
would not, correct the defects when given the opportunity to do so (id. art. 2522).
The warranty of fitness, on the other hand, only applies when: (1) the seller has
reason to know the particular use the buyer intends for the thing or the buyer’s
particular purpose for buying it; and (2) that the buyer is relying on the seller’s
skill or judgment in selecting it. Id. art. 2524.
331. See generally id. art. 2524.
332. See discussion infra note 333.
333. The ten-year prescriptive period applicable to warranty of fitness claims
survives long after a redhibition claim, which expires against a good faith seller
four years from delivery of the thing or one year from discovery of the defect and
against a bad faith seller one year from discovery of the defect. See LA. CIV. CODE
art. 2534. Courts are addressing cases in the context of prescription because
plaintiffs are filing suit after the one-year redhibitory claim prescribes but before
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Along with the repeal of ordinary fitness, the legislature must outline
the interplay of the warranties of redhibition and fitness for particular use
in a situation in which an item is unfit for a particular purpose only because
of a redhibitory defect.334 When a thing sold contains a redhibitory defect,
the law of redhibition should govern.335 Moreover, if a thing suffers from
a redhibitory defect, the buyer ought to be limited to a cause of action in
redhibition even when that defect renders the thing unfit for the buyer’s
particular use, the seller knew of the buyer’s intended use, and that the
buyer was relying on his skill in selecting the thing.336 In other words, as
a policy matter, the legislature should provide that the warranties of
redhibition and fitness for particular use are mutually exclusive causes of
action.337 Revision comments to that effect are necessary.338
CONCLUSION
The contribution of the warranty of fitness for ordinary use to
Louisiana sales law since its codification in 1995 can be summed up in
one word: confusion.339 The warranty has no independent meaning in
Louisiana and has prompted discrepancies among the courts.340 Without
clarity in the legislation, the courts can never be consistent. Consequently,
the legislature must repeal the warranty of fitness for ordinary use. 341
Repealing the warranty of fitness for ordinary use will promote clarity and
uniformity throughout the law of sales in Louisiana without detracting
the warranty of fitness claim prescribes, and defendants are filing exceptions of
prescription in response. See, e.g., Sw. La. Hosp. Ass’n v. BASC Constr.
Chemicals, LLC, 947 F. Supp. 2d 661 (W.D. La. 2013); Justiss Oil Co. v. T3
Energy Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-01745, 2011 WL 539135 (W.D. La. Feb. 7,
2011); Cunard Line Co. v. Datrex, Inc., 926 So. 2d 109 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
Courts are therefore forced to determine—often at the peremptory exception
phase—whether the product contains a defect in order to rule on the exception
and decide whether the claim will proceed. If this trend continues, the warranty
of fitness will never develop because courts will continue dismissing cases based
on the existence of defects rather than the merits of the warranty.
334. Bilbe, supra note 20, at 142. As a rule of statutory construction, the
particular controls over the general, so defective things should remain under the
realm of redhibition.
335. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520.
336. See generally id.
337. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
338. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
339. See discussion supra Parts II.A.1–2.
340. See discussion supra Parts II.A.1–2.
341. See supra Part III.
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from the substantive law.342 Cases regarding breach of ordinary fitness are
sufficiently addressed under the warranty of redhibition, and the warranty
of fitness for particular use sufficiently covers cases of non-defective but
otherwise non-conforming goods.343 Thus, the repeal will not create a gap
in the law but, instead, will merge the concepts of redhibition and fitness
for ordinary use. Indeed, repeal of the warranty of fitness for ordinary use
is vital for the preservation of redhibition, as well as the development of
fitness for particular use, both of which will increase overall stability
throughout Louisiana sales law.
Sara Daniel*

342. See discussion supra Part III.
343. See discussion supra Part III.
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